As stated in the article, Theorems 2 and 4 are incorrect. They refer to strict equilibrium actions in the limit P → P when in fact the results only hold for pure, evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) that are uniform in this limit. The corrected versions along with the definition of a uniformly ESS are included below. Definition An equilibrium s is a uniformly ESS in the limit as P → P if there is a punctured neighborhoodU(s) of s such that for all s ∈U(s) and all P = P in some neighborhood of P ,
Theorem 2 Suppose lim P→ P a m B(R, a, P) ∩ B(B, a, P) = 0.

Then every pure, uniformly ESS satisfies the Never an Initial Best Response
Property at P .
1
Proof Suppose that s is a pure, uniformly ESS such that m BR −1 (s) remains strictly positive in the limit P → P . We will identify a nonvanishing region inside the basins of attraction of s for both replicator dynamics and best response dynamics. As a pure strategy equilibrium, s can be written as (x s = 1, x −s = 0) where s is the action always taken in this equilibrium. Let U(s) be a neighborhood of s such thatU(s) = U(s)\{s} satisfies the condition for s to be a uniformly
We have constructed W(s) such that x ∈Ẇ(s) implies thaṫ x s > 0 under the replicator dynamics (because by the ESS condition, action s has better than average payoff here) and in turn,ẋ s > 0 implies that x remains in W(s).
We now observe that BR −1 (s) is a convex set because of the linearity of payoffs. Additionally, since s is a pure Nash Equilibrium, s ∈ BR −1 (s). Thus, BR −1 (s) and W(s) have positive intersection. By the fact that W(s) is independent of P and our hypothesis that BR −1 (s) is nonvanishing, we conclude that m W(s) ∩ BR −1 (s) remains strictly positive in the limit P → P . Note that by the ESS condition and the linearity of payoffs, we can rule out the possibility that there are multiple best responses anywhere in the interior of BR −1 (s). For points x in the interior of W(s) ∩ BR −1 (s), best response dynamics flows to s because BR(x) = {s} and replicator dynamics flows to s because x ∈ W(s).
Theorem 4 Suppose
lim P→ P a m B(OSPP, a, P) ∩ B(TD, a, P) = 0.
Then every pure, uniformly ESS satisfies the Never an Initial Best Response
Property at P . Proof The proof here mirrors the one for Theorem 2. We construct the neighborhood W(s) in the same way, but with the additional condition that x s > 1 −K. We need only show that for x ∈ int W(s) ∩ BR −1 (s) , both classes of dynamics flow to s. Under one-sided payoff positive dynamics,ẋ s > 0 for x ∈ W(s) because action s has an above average payoff, and such a flow cannot leave W(s). Under threshold dynamics, when x ∈ int W(s) ∩ BR −1 (s) , Eq. 5 applies to all actions other than s because they have payoffs below theK th percentile. All other actions must have the same negative growth rate, sȯ x = α(s − x) for some positive constant α.
